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The Prospect for International Law in
the Twentieth Century*
MANLEY

0. HUDSON

Bemis Professor of International Law, Harvard Law School
I. THE TER-CENTENARY OF GROTIUS
Three hundred years, almost to a day, have now passed since
Grotius published his magnum opus, De Jure Belli ac Pacis.' If the
event may not be taken to have marked the beginning of modern

international law, if, indeed, we must say that "the famous book of
1625 was not a treatise devoted to international law", 2 we are nevertheless justified in taking the date as our historical point de dpart
in any survey of attempts to find a law of nations which will serve
and order the modern world of states. The illustrious president of
Cornell University, Mr. Andrew D. White, may have been a bit
extravagant in saying that "of all works not attributed to divine
inspiration" Grotius' book "has been the most fruitful in results to
mankind."' But certainly we do not err in feeling a deep sense of
obligation to a scholar to whose work we still turn, on whose inspiration we still draw, long after we have forgotten most of the men of
action who have played parts in the international scene during these
three centuries. "Of so great consequence are sometimes the silent
exertions of the closet, to the more active and louder professions
'4
which contend with it for the government of the world."
Our generation cannot more fittingly celebrate the ter-centenary
of Grotius than by a careful inquiry into the place of law in the world
*Two addresses before the Cornell University College of Law, under the Schiff
Foundation, March 3o and 31, 1925.
'Professor Jesse Reeves sets the approximate date of publication at the Frankfort Fair as March i7, 1625. See i Amer. Jour. Int. Law, p. 2o. The publication at Paris was in June of the same year. See also Vreeland, Hugo Grotius,
p. 2164.
Professor van Vollenhoven, in i9 Amer. Jour. Int. Law, p. i.
'Andrew D. White, Seven Great Statesmen, p. ioi. See also the Proceedings
at the Laying of a Wreath on the Tomb of Hugo Grotius, July 4, 1899, by the commission of the United States of America to the International Peace Conference of
The
Hague, p. 14.
4
Robert Ward, An Enquiry Into The Foundation and History of the Law of
Nations in Europe (1795), II, p. 364.
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of states of our own time. We live in an era which has much in
common with that in which Grotius did his pioneering; and if we
will know the coursewhich law has run since he gave it fresh start, if
we will take stock of the currents and tendencies of our own century,
we may improve our own opportunities to give direction to future
effort, even though we may not hope to rival his achievement. In
1625, world society was being reshaped by the Thirty Years' War,
very much as today it is being reshaped by the consequences of the
World War. Grotius explained the reason for beginning his work in
terms which have a familiar ring in our own ears:
"...I saw prevailing throughout the Christian world a license
in making war of which even barbarous nations would have been
ashamed; recourse being had to arms for slight reasons or
no reason; and when arms were once taken up, all reverence for
divine and human law was thrown away, just as if men were
thenceforth authorized tocommit all crimes without restraint."5
If Grotius had the advantage of living when political events were
creating in men's minds a new hospitality to conceptions of a universal
ethics, we may have the advantage of living when events in the physical world are creating in men's minds a new hospitality to the ordering of the nations' common life. If Grotius lived when philosophers
were emerging from a ruinous bankruptcy, so we may reap the harvest of the War's demonstration that our political and juristic theories
have lagged behind the changes which were wrought by the industrial revolution of the nineteenth century.
Human action does not pour itself into the moulds of the Gregorian
calendar, but centuries frequently serve as yardsticks for measuring
progress. With the contributions of the seventeenth century so
vivid in our recollections, with the impetus of Grotius' labors projected as a living reality into our twentieth century, what do we
propose to make of our heritage and our opportunity? What shall
be the addition made by our generation in passing on the stock of
ideas with which we were endowed? How shall we capitalize the
transitions in which we have been forced to participate? What do
we hope to be the contribution of the twentieth century to the progress
of international law?
High time it is that such enquiry were under way! A quarter of
our century has passed already. Not only has it seen shaken the
juristic foundations of our state system, but it has seen greatly increased the juristic pessimism which would rob our efforts of the confidence which must be their inspiration. The ter-centenary has
5

Prologomena,

28

(Whewell's Translation, p. lix.).
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arrived at a propitious time, and its celebration challenges us to reflect on our present situation and on the methods by which we are to
begin to meet its demands.
Now I think it is quite clear that the way in which we shall take
advantage of our opportunities will depend very largely on the picture which we paint of ourselves while we are engaged in the effort.
We shall be limited to some extent by the achievements of the past
to which we have fallen heir; but we shall be limited more by the
patterns which are lodged in our minds. Mr. Pound has told us
that "the nineteenth century achieved relatively so little in international law" because "the jurists of the last century had no confidence
in themselves qua jurists." 6 The contributions of the twentieth
century will be great or little in proportion to the confidence which
we have in ourselves as builders. This does not mean that power can
be summoned by an act of will. It means rather that our conception
of the nature of our task must give direction to our efforts and our
enthusiasm will condition their results. In the end we may prove to
be no bigger than our race, but unless we are slaves to the Hegelian
tradition we have ample scope for achievement within that limitation.
The satisfaction which we take in Grotius' accomplishments should
help us to see that the range of our own action is by no means narrow.
We must recognize in the beginning that progress is not simply the
result of that automatic process which speeds the calendar on its
way. 7 The thoughts of men are neither widened nor narrowed by
the process of the suns. Fortunately the effort which must produce
progress can be consciously directed.
During the past century much of our juristic effort was confined
to a mere working over of materials which had been handed down to
us. There were a few outstanding figures, such as Lord Stowell and
Chief Justice Marshall, who dared to indulge in speculation under the
cloak of current philosophy. But in the main, students of the law of
nations felt themselves bound by what their teachers had said, and
they contented themselves with lengthening and broadening the
received tradition as practical necessities goaded them into reaching
results. The conception that new foundations might be laid or new
6
Roscoe Pound, "Philosophical Theory and International Law," published in
Bibliotheca Visseriana, I, pp. 73, 88.
"Making or finding law, call it which you will, presupposes a mental picture of
what one is doing and of why he is doing it." Roscoe Pound, An Introduction to
the7 Philosophy of Law (1922), p. 59.
"The doctrine of evolution has been used to give a kind of cosmic sanction to
the notion of an automatic and wholesale progress in human affairs.. .Progress is
not automatic; it depends upon human intent and aim and upon acceptance of
responsibility for its production." John Dewey, "Progress," International
Journal of Ethics, vol. 26 (April, 1916), p. 315.
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superstructures builded would have smacked in many minds of
disloyalty to the masters. The general attitude was that levels
should be maintained and that sound thinking should essay no
more. 8 Now it is obvious that such an attitude would never have
produced a Grotius, and I think it is equally obvious that it will not
suffice for our endeavor in the period which now stretches itself before us. As Professor van Vollenhoven has put it, "law is not any
longer to us a plane, a thing of two dimensions; it has got three
dimensions."

If we would make it possible for the future to look back upon the
twentieth century as we now look back upon the seventeenth century, we cannot go onwith the imitative process which contented our
immediate predecessors. We cannot hope to find in their work all
that is needed for our own building. If our century is to be another
formative period in international law, we must understand not only
the content of Grotius' achievement, but also the methods which
made it possible. We must re-examine the foundations of the law
of nations by the methods which Grotius himself employed. We
need yield nothing in our admiration of Lord Stowell and John Marshall, but we cannot content ourselves with quoting what they said.
New needs have come with the manifold changes in world society
and new furrows may have to be plowed to meet them. We must have
not only the patience and the detachment necessary to understand
them, but also the boldness to make the departures which understanding may prompt us to undertake.
Even if there had been no World War, our generation would have
had the privilege of addressing itself to this task. We should probably have felt the call less imperative, and we should doubtless have
turned our faces in other directions. We might have gone on with
the Hague Conferences and with their attempts to build machinery;
we might have succeeded in establishing an international court of
justice without any compulsory jurisdiction; we might have set up
an international prize court; and we should doubtless have continued
the efforts to develop a law of war and neutrality based upon experience in the conflicts of the nineteenth century. 10 But following
so closely as we do upon the spiritual and intellectual upheavals of
the decade since 1914, we find our responsibilities increased many8
We have "attempted to maintain existing values, but rarely to create new
ones." Professor J. L. Brierly, "The Shortcomings of International Law,"
British Year-Book of International Law, 1924, p. 4, 9.
9ig Amer. Jour. Int. Law, 7.
'OThe Second Conference expressed the opinion that "the preparation of regulations relative to the laws and customs of naval war should figure in the program
of the next Conference." 2 U. S. Treaties and Conventions (Malloy), p. 2379.
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fold and we cannot fail to attempt to learn the new lessons which the
world's travail has put before us. There are few signs that the "reaction towards increased stringency of law" which W. E. Hall foresaw in 1889,11 has yet set in, and we may well doubt whether it is
stringency that we need. To take a single example, the encouragement given by the War to the use of the air for transportation and
communication has made it quite impossible for us to go on with some
of the ideas which obtained in the last century. However else the
world may seek to restore itself to pre-war normalcy, the generation
which waged the war and the generation which just escaped it will
hardly be content to have restored the system of international law
which prevailed when the twentieth century opened. We are confronted with the challenge which sudden transition always brings,
and upon our method of meeting it the development of international
law in the twentieth century will largely depend.
The War has left many specific problems which cry out to us for
solution. They are so numerous, so varied, and so bewildering, their
background is so new, so shifting and so complicated that even if the
War had purified us as some people seem to believe,2 we could hardly
summon the courage to face them without a pretty clear understanding of our situation and of the methods by which our work may be
done. Two fundamental tasks lie at the threshold of our endeavor,
therefore, and they must receive attention before our generation can
entertain much hope of solving specific problems. The first task is
13
the renovation of the philosophical bases of the law of nations;
the second task is the improvement of the method by which nations
may consciously legislate to enact international law. The first involves a choice of the direction in which our century shall go, while
the second involves a choice of the vehicles in which our journey
shall be undertaken.
II. CURRENT PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Like jurisprudence, philosophy is a word which to use Maitland's
phrase "stinks in the nostrils of a practicing lawyer." Yet we must
recognize that no juristic effort is possible except as it is based on
nW.E. Hall, International Law (3 ed.), p. x.
r2In 1919, Mr. Elihu Root pronounced us "ten times as good a people as we
were
five years before." Root, Men and Policies (1924), p. 209.
13

The recent volume on "The Renascence of International Law," by Manfred
Nathan (Grotius Society Publications, No. 3) is very disappointing in this connection. A far more useful study is Oppenheim, The Future of International
Law, republished by the Carnegie Endowment of International Law in 1921,
but first published under the title Die Zukunft des V61kerrechts in 1911. See also
Jitta, La Rdnovation du Droit International (i9i9).

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
some philosophy, and the very men who are most loath to admit this
fact are they who most blandly and most blithely indulge their
philosophical assumptions. International law has suffered from nothing else as from our unwillingness to deal with its underlying philosophy in the open. John Chipman Gray thought that "on no subject of human interest, except theology, has there been so much loose
14
writing and nebulous speculation as on international law."' It was
one of the chief contributions of Grotius that he exposed the philosophical assumptions which other writers of his day indulged but
did not admit.15 The same service needs to be performed for our
century. Judge Cardozo has told us that "inplicit in every decision
where the question is, so to speak, at large, is a philosophy of the origin and aim of law, a philosophy which, however veiled, is in truth
the final arbiter.""6 How many of our questions in international law
are in this sense "at large"!
Two great services were rendered to international law by the nineteenth century. In the first place, it was emancipated from theology
and received into our general jurisprudence. The tendency in this
direction had been inaugurated by Grotius himself. Much attention
was given to the doubts raised by Austin whether international law
was in any strict sense law, and though little purpose was served by
the long controversy,' 7 it may have had some effect toward freeing
international law from the associations which had kept it apart from
the general currents in juristic science. The great work of Ward,
published just before the century opened, had been based on the conception that the foundations of the law of nations were to be sought
in Christianity and revealed religion.' 8 Down into the century that
fashion lingered. In 182'7, Chancellor Kent attributed the establishment of international law to "the brighter light, the more certain
truths and the'more definite sanction which Christianity has communicated to the ethical jurisprudence of the ancients."'" In 1834
Joseph Story accredited the growth of the law of nations to "the
14
Gray, Nature and Sources of the Law (2 ed.), p. 127. Cf. Zitelmann, Die
Unvollkonmenheit des V61kerrechts ('919), p. 14.
15"Truth, in the pursuit of which Aristotle faithfully spent his life, suffers no
oppression so great as that which is inflicted in Aristotle's name." Prologomena,
42. (Whewell's Translation, II, lxviii.)
"Cardozo, The Growth of the Law (1924), pp. 25-6. See also, Lehman, "The

Influence of the Universities on Judicial Decision," 10 CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
1, 7; Wigmore, Cases on Torts (1912), preface, viii.

17"A vast deal of time has been wasted in controversy over the question whether
international law is law at all." John Bassett Moore, International Law and
Some Current Illusions (1924), p. 291.

"sWard, History of the Law of Nations, I, pp. xi, 77.

19Kent, Commentaries (1827), I, p. 3.
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combined influence of Christianity and commerce."2 0 As late as 1839,
Manning wrote that "the law of nature, by the obligations of which
states are bound, being identical with the will of God, it is necessary
to ascertain that will, which is done either by consulting direct
revelation, where that is declaratory, or by the application of human
reason where revelation is silent."2' 1 It is not strange that Austin
should have put international law into the category of "positive
morality" in that day. But few writers in the twentieth century
will feel it necessary to preserve any nexus between the law of
nations and religion, and a recent author has sought to exclude from
his definition all "reference to the moral standards by which the
rules of international law should be tested."22
The second service of the last century was in some degree a corollary
to this divorcement of law and religion-it was the widening of the
circle of nations within which the law of nations must be applied.
The eighteenth century had been concerned with the law applicable
to the states of Europe. It was a natural consequence of the association of Christianity and the law of nations that the latter should
prevail only where the former was embraced. Ward wrote that
"what is commonly called the law of nations, is not the law of all
nations, but only of such sets or classes of them as are united together by familiar religions and systems of morality."
Hence "the
Christian nations of Europe" were said by Chancellor Kent to have
"established a law of nations peculiar to themselves," 24 and the limitation was not challenged by any wider reaches of culture or of
commerce during the eighteenth century.
But the opening of the new world necessitated some extension.
When the Continental Congress of the American colonies enacted a
law for the regulation of maritime captures, in 1781, it prescribed
that "the rules of decision in the several courts" should include "the
law of nations according to the general usages of Europe."' With
the growth of the independence movement in South America, the
number of nations which professed the law of nations was greatly
enlarged, though for a time it was not clear whether the new states
20
Story,
21

Conflict of Laws (1834), § 3.
Manning, Commentaries on the Law of Nations (1839), p. 58.
2Fenwick,
International Law (1924), p. 34.
2
'Ward, History of the Law of Nations, p. 76.
24

Kent, Commentaries, I, p. 3.

25Journals

of

the Continental Congress (Hunt's Ed.), XXI, p. i58.

For the theory by which the United States continued to be bound by the law of
nations after the separation from England, see Lodge's Works of Hamilton (1885),
p. 89. Apparently, the application of the law of nations to the relations of the
thirteen American colonies inter se was little discussed. See also Works of
James Wilson (ed. by Andrews, 1896), I, p. 128 ff.
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were to adopt the European state system as their model.26 Soon
thereafter the "family of nations" began to be organized along other
lines than those of religious faith. In 1856, Turkey was admitted
"to participate in the advantages of the public law and system of
Europe," 27 though not until the Lausanne Conference recognized the
abolition of the capitulations in 1923, did she achieve a regular
standing. Before the end of the century, also, Japan had been fully
admitted to the "advantages" of the public law which once had been
the exclusive possession of Christian peoples,28 and to some extent
China, Persia and Siam began to share in them. As to China, the
declarations of the Powers represented at the Washington Conference in 1922, including what Mr. Elihu Root has called "the great
objective of an independent China under international law,"2 9
rather question than establish her independent position. In fact,
many communities still have a doubtful position in the "family of
nations," 30 but by the events of the nineteenth century the law of
nations has ceased to be the law of a continent embracing the Christian religion.
International Law has not yet been universalized, however. Professor Oppenheim therefore felt it necessary to distinguish between
the universal and the general law. Mr. Root distinguishes between
the "peoples who are subject to international law and peoples who are
not subject to that law."'" The resolutions of the Fifth International
Conference of American States meeting at Santiago in 1923 still
2A century ago the United States was debating the formation of a confederation with the independent states of South America. See Snow, American
Diplomacy (1895), pp. 295-312. For questions which arose as to the representation of Latin-American states at the Second Hague Conference, see U. S.
Foreign Relations, 19o5, p. 828; 19o6, p. 1625, 1631; 1907, p. 1I10 ff. Brazil
was invited to the First Hague Conference, but declined the invitation. Scott,
Hague
Conventions and Declarations, p. vi.
27
Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, II, p. 1254. "It is of vital importance,
that Grotius admits the Turkish government to share on an equality in the mass
of 28
rights and privileges." Figgis, From Gerson to Grotius (i916), p. 286.
In x875, David Dudley Field read a paper before the Institute of International
9 Law on the "Applicability of International Law to Oriental Nations."
2 Root, Men and Policies, p. 458. Cf. Willoughby, "Principles of International Law and Justice Raised by China at the Washington Conference,"
Amer. Soc. Int. Law, 1922, p. 19.
Proc.
30
mmigration quotas under the United States Immigration Law of 1924 are
attributed to many countries which would probably not be included in a list of
the pr sent members of the "family of nations;" for example, Andorra, Arabian
Bhutan, Muscat, Nepal, and Yap.
Peninsula,
31
Root, Men and Policies, p. 454. Professor John Westlake, writing in 1894,
included in "international society" all European states, all American states, and
"a few Christian states in other parts of the world." Westlake, Principles of
International Law (1894), p. 81.
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deal with "American International Law" 3 as if it had some inde-

pendence of the general international law, and apparently the American Institute of International Law would perpetuate the distinction.3 The fact seems to be that we have not yet extended international law to all the peoples of the world. We frequently limit it
to "civilized" states34 as once we limited it to "Christian" states,
and hence the Permanent Court of International Justice is enjoined
by its statute to apply "the general principles of law recognized by
civilized states."3 5 It was the boast of Chief Justice Marshall in
x825 that "Russia and Geneva have equal rights", 3 and for a century
we have proudly rehearsed the phrase. But it was not then true that
Russia and Turkey had equal rights, and it is hardly more true of
Russia and Persia today. It must be the aspiration of our twentieth
century to make the statement of our law of nations conform to the
facts of our present-day world, and we may have to admit that there
is yet no law of nations by which all nations are bound.
These achievements of the nineteenth century assisted in undermining the law of nature philosophy on which the law of nations has
been founded since before the days of Grotius. 37 No doubt that philnSee Report of American Delegates, p. 131. The Fourth International Conference of American States distinguished between "matters of universal application" and matters of "American application." See Report of American Delegates, Senate Doc. 744, 6ist Cong., 3d Sess., p. 99.
The existence of any special American or Latin-American International law is
refuted in Sa Vianna, De la Non-Existence d'un Droit International Am6ricain
(1912). At the Fifth International Conference of American States in 1923, it was
stoutly defended by Seffor Alvarez (Chile) and stoutly opposed by Mr. Daniel
Antokoletz (Argentina). Verbatim Record of the Plenary Sessions, I, pp. 426442. See, also, the protest of Professor A. Pearce Higgins, British Year-Book of
International Law, 1923-24, p. I54; and Fauchille, Droit International Public
(1922), I, p. 34. But in his remarks before the Governing Board of the PanAmerican Union on March 2, 1925, Mr. Charles E. Hughes said: "It is natural
that the law to be applied by the American Republics should, in addition to the
law universal, contain not a few rules of American origin and adapted to American exigencies, and that the old and the new taken together should constitute
what may be called American international law."
3See 6 Revista de Derecho Intemacional, p. 245.
UProfessor Westlake is one of the few writers who have attempted to say what is
meant by "civilized." Westlake, Principles of International Law (1895), pp.
141-143. But his statement that the treatment of natives in Africa. is to be left
"to the conscience of the state to which the sovereignty is awarded" needs to be
modified, now that the mandate system has been adopted.
sArticle 38. See Hudson, The Permanent Court of International Justice
P. 346.
(1925),
3
01n The Antelope, io Wheaton 66, (1825). Professor P. J. Baker refers to this as
the "favorite argument" of the giant and the dwarf. Baker, "Doctrine of Legal
Equality of States," British Year-Book of International Law, 1923-24, p. 8.
Professor Garner has recently spoken of the equality of states as a "useless fiction." Garner, Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Relations,
Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev., XIX, p. 20.
al"It is notorious that all authorities down to the end of the eighteenth century
and almost all outside England to this day have treated it [international law]
as a body of doctrine derived from and justified by the law of nature." Pollock,
The History of the Law of Nature, 2 Columbia Law Rev. (1902) 131, 132.
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osophy served useful ends in the eighteenth century, and possibly
also in the nineteenth; but in the twentieth century it is of doubtful
utility38s Blackstone conceived of a law of nature "coeval with mankind and dictated by God himself," and therefore "binding all over the
globe, in all countries and at all times.""9 But in 1825 Chief Justice
Marshall succeeded in upholding the enslavement of the African
negroes whose fate was involved in The Antelope,4e in spite of his admission that the slave trade was "contrary to the law of nature,"
partly on the ground that the law of nations of the continent of
Africa allowed prisoners to be made slaves. When Justice Story
assumed the Dane Professorship at the Harvard Law School in 1829,
he announced a course of lectures on the law of nature and of nations,
explaining in his inaugural discourse that the law of nature "lies
at the foundation of all other laws, and constitutes the first step in
the science of jurisprudence." 41 It was well into the nineteenth
century before it became unfashionable to base the law of nations on
the law of nature,4 and the disapproval of fashion has not yet banished the practise. Indeed a distinct school of thought seems bent
on a revival of the law of nature." The "reason" and the "right
reason" to which we make such constant appeal frequently differ
little from the "nature" which formerly served as our storehouse,"
and hence a recent writer tells us that the "real law of nations" is
38
"What natural law and natural law methods have done for the law of nations
in the past stands high above all doubt, but they have lost their value and im-

portance for present and future times."
national Law

p. 56-7.
39I Blackstone, Commentaries, 41.

Oppenheim, The Future of Inter-

(1921),

40o Wheaton 66 (1825).,
41
Story, Miscellaneous Writings, p. 465. The readings for Story's course at the
Harvard Law School first included Martens' Law of Nations, Rutherforth's
Institutes of Natural Law, Ward's Law of Nations, Vattel's Law of Nations, and
Bynkershoek's Law of War. King's College in the City of New York (later
Columbia University) had a professorship of natural law from 1773 to 1776, held
by John Vardill.
4Mr. Pound tells us that the conception of a law of nature has "held on longer
in international law than elsewhere." Bibliotheca Visseriana, I, p. 83. Lorimer,
writing in 1883, defined the law of nations as "the law of nature realized in the
relations of separate states." Lorimer, Institutes of the Law of Nations, I, p. i.
Sir Frederick Pollock referred to the term "law of nature and of nations" as still
current
in Scotland in 191o. Cambridge Modern History, vol. XII, p. 703.
43Cathrein, Die Grundlage des V6lkerrechts (1918), p. 29; O'Rahilly "The
Law
of Nations," Studies (Dublin, December, 1920), p. 579.
44
"Natural law may fairly claim, in principle though not by name, the reasonable man of English and American law and all his works." Pollock, "The History
of the Law of Nature," i Col. Law Rev. II, 29; 2 Ibid, 131, I36. "If Natural
Law is but too often made to serve as a cloak to individual whims and groundless
claims, the same arguments that were formerly adduced under its generic name
may still prevail under the less ambitious titles of equity, humanity, morality,
common interest, logic, reason, consistency, etc." Kaeckenbeeck, International
Rivers (1918), pp. 8-9.
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written "in the hearts of civilized and instructed people." 4 The
American Institute of International Law has but recently invited the
nations to declare that "all nations have the right to claim and, according to the Declaration of Independence of the United States, 'to
assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and of nature's God entitle them;' ,4
and Dr. James Brown Scott has proposed that this be embodied
in a twentieth century code, apparently on the theory that "there is
a universal law of reason, of justice and of conscience, of which the
law of nations is naturally a part." 47 Professor Edwin D. Dickinson
finds in the American Institute's declaration "nothing which we could
not have read in a seventeenth century edition of 'The Laws of War

and Peace.'

"48

Similarly, we still have recrudescences of the conception of the
social compact in our prevailing theories, and they do not fail to
influence the form of our conventional statements. Professor Charles
Cheney Hyde, in his excellent treatise published three years ago, tells
us that "the basis of the law imposing common rules of restraint has
been the consent of the several independent states which were to be
governed thereby;" such consent is said to be "yielded by necessary implication," and Mr. Hyde then proceeds to treat the hypothesis as an explanation of historical origin by assuring us that it
has been "irrevocably given. ' 49 The bare statement is so out of
consonance with the juristic thought of today that the author would
probably be the first to repudiate its philosophical implications.
The "consent" which so many writers seek to establish is merely a
substitute for the "nature" which they would repudiate, and Oppen4
1Thomas Baty, "Danger-Signals in International Law," 34 Yale Law Journal
(March, 1925) 457. "Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod promulgatio legis naturae
est ex hoc ipso quod Deus earn mentibus hominum inseruit naturaliter cognoscendam."
Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I-2, qu. 9o, a. 4.
46
In the Declaration of Rights and Duties of Nations, adopted in Washington,
January 6, I9i6. Dr. Scott has explained that this declaration "differs from other
projects of a like kind in that it is not based solely, or indeed at all, upon philosophic principles, but is based exclusively upon decisions of the Supreme Court of
the United States." Scott, The American Institute of International Law: Its
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Nations (I916), foreword. This may be
thought to confuse the dicta of the Justices with the decisions of the Court, however.
47

Scott, "The Codification of International Law", 18 Amer. Jour. Int. Law,
The proposal is apparently being made also by the American Institute of International Law. See 6 Revista de Derecho Internacional (Novem-

260,266, 280.

ber,
48 1924),

p. 259.

New Republic, February 26, I916.

49Hyde, International Law (1922), I, p. 4. See also, Salmond, Jurisprudence
(7th ed., 1924), p. 33. The law of nations derived from a law of nature was once
thought to bind nations even againsttheir will. Martens, EuropdischeV61kerrecht
(1796), p. 2. Cf. Franz von Liszt, Das V61kerrecht (i918), p. 7.
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heim's attempt to rationalize "common consent" as a matter of fact
involved him in all the tergiversations of the naturalists. 0
Such instances of our failure to develop a philosophy of the law of
nations susceptible of statement in modem terms, are not without
far-reaching practical consequences. They have prevented us from
evolving any accepted theory of rights, and in consequence we spend
much of our time in discussion which, as Mr. Roland R. Foulke has
pointed out, "begs the question by assuming that there is a right,
and then without defining it, enumerating what the writer conceives
may be done in the exercise of that right." 5' In the middle of the
last century, President Woolsey introduced his treatise with the
statement that "the creator of man has implanted in his nature certain conceptions which we call rights, to which in every case obligations correspond,15 2 and his approach is by no means out of fashion.
The American Institute of International Law declares that the "fundamental rights" which the "municipal law of civilized nations
recognizes and protects" can be "stated in terms of international
law;" and it proceeds to attribute to every nation a series of natural
rights-a right to exist, a right to independence, a right to equality,
and a right to territory-buttressed with quotations of John Marshall's dicta pronounced when the law of nature was still supreme in
America, and before Bentham's influence had begun to be felt on
this side of the Atlantic. Similarly, Mr. IHyde conceives of natural
rights possessed by every state--a "right to acquire territory" and
to exercise therein "an exclusive right of property and control;"
a "right to do justice in its own domain;" a "right to expel an alien;"
a "right to live and develop;" and a "right" to determine the extent
of its relations with other states. The objection to such a method
is not so much its disconsonance with what is going on in other fields
of juristic science; it is not so much the maintenance by writers of
individual grab-bags out of which these "rights" are drawn to fit
occasions; it is rather that such formulations, in advance of the process of weighing competing interests which wise judges always go
through in reaching results, affect the process itself and often create
See Pound,"Theories
50Oppenheim, International Law (3d ed., 1920), I, p. 14 ff.
of Law," 22 Yale Law Journal 114, 135.
5Foulke, International Law (1920), I, 155. See Oppenheim, The Future of
International Law, p. 59. The following statement of Mr. Elihu Root is an
example of the effect of our use of the term right: "The fundamental ideas of
international law are, first, that each nation has a right to live according to its
own conceptions of life; second, that each national right is subject to the equal
identical right of every other nation." Root, Men and Policies, p. 429. Such
doctrine means of course an "anarchy of sovereignties." Dupuis, Le Droit des
Gems
52 et les Rapports des Grandes Puissances (1920), p. 7.
Woolsey, International Law (I86o), p. i.
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dispositions to reach certain results without reference to the process.3
Certain it is that the resort to natural rights has had an anti-social
tendency which only increases the difficulties of organizing the
society of nations under a universal law. It puts emphasis on independence at a time when we are seeking to take account of the new
inter-dependence of peoples."
It was the habit of such approach, also, which rendered our profession so ineffective in dealing with the new problems which arose
during the War. It maybe too much to hope that any achievement in
juristic science will serve in time of war to overcome the excesses of
nationalistic fervor. Yet we might have hoped that our professional
efforts would have furnished surer guides to judgment than seemed
available while the War was on. Any people fighting a war will be
tempted to look chiefly for a law that will restrain its enemies, and
the traditional body of war laws had been evolved under wholly
different conditions of warfare, not on any foundations of general
interest but chiefly as a result of the exigencies of past struggles."
But even in neutral countries the legal guides were so inadequate that
they furnished few anchors to public opinion, and hence any departure from the traditional practices which belligerents had followed
under different circumstances was met with moralistic condemnation
by all peoples whose national interests it did not serve. Discussion of
blockade and the use of submarines proceeded both during and after
the War in terms which afforded little opportunity for a careful
weighing of the issues involved. Little of the recent literature on
those two subjects is a credit, to the profession, though one article
by James Parker Hall is a notable exception. 6
But the inadequacy which results from our failure to build a
better philosophical foundation for our law does not simply beset our
profession in time of war. It is a serious handicap to us in dealing with
many of our current problems in time of peace. In all our statements
of the law of recognition of foreign governments, we have furnished
little assistance to the courts which have been called upon to deal
with problems arising from the failure of the United States to recog5See Pound, "Legal Rights," 26 International Journal of Ethics (1915), p.
Pound, Interpretations of Legal History (1923), p. 159.
sCf. Garner, "Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Rela-

92;

tions", American Political Science Review, XIX, p. 1-24.

"John Quincy Adams wrote of the British maritime law in 1796, "I never
could find that their admiralty Courts were governed by any other code" but
"Britannia rule the waves." Quoted in Warren, The Supreme Court in United
States History (1922), II, p. 28. See Professor Westlake's explanation, in Principles
of International Law, p. 84.
5
6Hall, "The Force of Precedents in International Law," International Journal
of Ethics, vol. 26, p. 149.

THE CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
nize the Government of Soviet Russia; and though the courts of
New York have been dealing with such cases frequently during the
past two years, we still lack any statement of the American law of
recognition which would enable a lawyer to advise a client with much
confidence. 7 The decisions may still leave a citizen's rights in property acquired in Russia dependent on what the political branch of
the Government may later decide as to the relations between the two
governments.58 Similarly, our statements as to the immunity of
foreign public vessels engaged in commerce left the courts with little
9
guide to follow,, and when Judge Mack decided The Pesaro"
he felt
himself faced with a "confessedly new and unsettled problem",
and in his endeavor to search out "the practical ends of law in a
moving, working world" he derived little aid from all our statements
of the theory during the past hundred years.
We still lack, also, an adequate theory of treaty obligations.60
Mr. Hyde merely tells us that treaties are concluded "because in the
minds of the contracting parties their undertakings are to be performed, and because the rights of non-performance are given up."'"
In the absence of explanation, we resort to analogies drawn from
municipal law. Mr. Fenwick declares that "a treaty providing for
the cession of territory, such as the treaty between the United States
and Russia in 1867, differs in no appreciable way from a deed of sale
executed between two individual citizens of the same state," as if
57

See Russian Government v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 293 Fed. 133 (1919); Wulfsohn v. Russian Republic, 234 N. Y. 372 (1923); Sokoloffv. National CityBank,
239 N. Y. 158 (1924); James & Co. v. Second Russian Insurance Co., 239 N.
Y. 248 (1925); Russian Reinsurance Co. v. Stoddard, 207 N. Y. Supp. 574
(1925). See also Connick, "The Effect of Soviet Decrees in American courts",
34 58Yale Law Journal 499.
Luther v. James Sagor & Co. 3 K. B. 532
592 7 7

Fed. 473 (1921).

[1921].

Cf. The Maipo, 259 Fed. 367 (1919).

The subject of

immunity of publicly owned ships was discussed at length at the International
Maritime Conference at Brussels, October, 1922. Report of the Delegates of the
United States, p. 18. See, also, International Maritime Committee, Bulletin No.
65,
6 for the discussion at the Gothenburg Conference of 1923.
See the excellent study of Professor Quincy Wright, "The Legal Nature of
Treaties" (1916) ioAmer. Jour. Int. Law, 7o6; Sir Cecil Hurst, "The Effect of
War on Treaties", British Year-Book of International Law, 1921-22, p. 37;
Denys P. Myers, "The Control of Foreign Relations", iiAmerican Political
Science Review 24, 30; Henry G. Crocker, "Codification of International Law",
i8 Amer. Jour. Int. Law, 38 ff. Mr. Crocker would provide in an international
code that "states are presumed to know the national law of other states" with
respect to the competence of state organs to exercise the treaty-making power;
while Mr. Thomas Baty says "it is never incumbent on states to study the constitutional law of other powers." 34 Yale Law Journal 477.
6'Hyde, International Law, II, p. 2. President Woolsey likened a treaty to a
contract which "is one of the highest acts of human free will." Woolsey, International
Law, 235.
2
6 Fenwick, International Law (1924), p. 316.
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the interests of the inhabitants were to be disregarded in international
barter. But the analogy to contracts is much more frequent and
quite as misleading. In Hooperv. U.S.,61 an American court assumed
the Anglo-American doctrine of consideration to form a part of the
law of nations and found that a "failure of consideration" warranted
annulment of a treaty. And the peculiar American doctrine as to
the interpretation of a most-favored-nation clause seems in some degree due to the municipal law of consideration." We have not erected a doctrine of international law analogous to our American "freedom
of contract", but we have given wide sanctity to treaties in the
conception that they are perpetually and absolutely binding. The
Powers declared in 187, that "it is an essential principle of the law of
nations that no power can free itself from the engagements of a treaty,
nor modify its terms except with the assent of the contracting parties
by means of a friendly understanding." 6 Since such a strait-jacket
did not wholly discourage the negotiation of treaties, it was bound to
lead to statements of the doctrine of rebus sic stantibuswhich shocked
67
many people during the War.
It is chiefly the conception of treaties as contracts which has produced our reluctance to acknowledge their legislative quality. In
his Institutes published in X849, Richard Wildman stated that while
treaties "are recognized and enforced by international law," yet
"they no more form part of it, than the contracts of private persons
form part of the municipal law by which they are enforced."6"
Mr. Hyde follows a long line of writers in stating that "few treaties
are to be regarded as sources of international law."6 9 The purpose
of such statements is usually to exclude the possibility of a state's
Ct. Cl. 408 (1887).
"Bartram v. Robertson,
622

122 U. S. 116, 120 (1887).
6Such a doctrine was not unknown in the past, however. See Suarez, De
Legibus, ii, i9,7. quoted by Professor Alfred O'Rahilly in Studies (Dublin, December, 1920), p. 590.
6Declaration by Great Britain, Austria, France, Italy, North Germany, Russia
and Turkey, of January 17, 1871. Hertslet, Map of Europe by Treaty, III, p.
1904. See Professor Brierly's illuminating comment in the British Year-Book of
International Law, 1924, p. 14. Cf., also, the controversy over the PrussianAmerican treaties, described by Professor Jesse Reeves in ii Amer. Jour. Int.
Law
475 ff.
67
Time limits are usually included in modern treaties.
See Willoughby, "Principles of International Law and Justice Raised by China
at 68
the Washington Conference," Proc. Amer. Soc. Int. Law, 1922, p. 21.
Wildman, Institutes of International Law (1849), I, p. 2. Cf. the following
statement in Walker, Science of International Law (1893), p. 49 note: "Treaties
like other public records, although they do not themselves make international
law, and are not even conclusively binding, are evidence of certain rules observed
as 69
international law."
Hyde, International Law, I, p. 6. On the other hand, Oppenheim dealt with
treaties as a source of international law "which has of late become of the greatest
importance." Oppenheim, International Law (3 ed. 1920), I, p. 22.
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being called upon to recognize changes in international law which
other states may have agreed upon by treaty; but their effect has
been to encourage a general disposition to neglect the content of our
treaty law in dealing with the law of nations. Just as the law schools
tended a generation ago to ignore statutes in their exposition of the
common law, so they tend still to ignore treaties in their exposition
of international law. As a consequence, the many multi-partite
conventions of the last half century which have greatly extended the
field of international law"0 and under which so many of the daily
contacts of states are organized, find little place in our treatment of
the subject and are all but ignored by some writers. The omission
not only widens the gulf between taught law and state action; it
encourages the popular failure to accredit the progress which these
treaties represent, and it strengthens a popular notion that our world
society continues without any law. So many treaties are being
negotiated since the World War7' that we must of necessity abandon
this attitude, and with new means now available in the League of
Nations Treaty Series72 for acquaintance with their texts we shall
doubtless give greater emphasis to conventional law in the future.
The philosophy with which our generation must seek to endow
the law of nations cannot be builded without reference to what is
happening in other fields of juristic effort, nor may it ignore the
achievements in other fields of social science. It has often been
noted that "the work of Grotius has for its support all that the philosophers, the poets, the orators, and the critics of antiquity or of
modem times" could furnish. "He penetrated into all the sciences
between which and his own, he could discover any analogy; and he
examined the opinions of all great men of whatsoever class." 73
But in modern times, our international law has been too largely a
field by itself. In spite of the frequent borrowing of analogies, it
has lagged behind the evolution of municipal law, especially in America. It is not surprising therefore that so little draught has been
made on other social sciences. But the future law of nations must
seek contributions from history, from political science, from economics, from sociology and from social psychology if it would keep
70

See Garner, "Limitations on National Sovereignty in International Rela-

tions,"
I9 Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. I, 17.
71

Secretary Hughes is stated to have presented sixty-nine treaties for ratification while he was Secretary of State from 1921 to 1925; and in the first five years
of the League of Nations over eight hundred treaties were presented to the Secretariat
for registration.
72
The publication of the Treaty Series of the League of Nations was begun in
192o, and twenty-eight volumes have now appeared, containing the texts of 729
treaties
and engagements.
73
Ward, Law of Nations, II, 373.
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pace with the society which it serves;74 and a sound philosophical
basis for the international law of the twentieth century can only
result from "a functional critique of international law in terms of
' 75
social ends.
Now such a philosophy of international law is not to be constructed over night. It will not be the product of a single mind,76
nor the outgrowth of a single nation's practice, nor the elaboration of any series of international conferences. The century
will be fortunate if it produces a scholar whose work will compare
even remotely with that of Grotius; it will be more fortunate perhaps
if it sees begun a cooperation among scholars which will save the law
of nations from the sterile methods which characterized so many
juristic efforts during the last century. Happily, a legal order is not
to be achieved in any generation for all time. It is not a goal but a
process-it is not a destination but a method of travel. In building
the philosophy of our law of nations, we seek not a set of ideas but a
method of handling ideas. Progress will be made when we begin
to free ourselves from the "tyranny of phrases" and to analyze some
of our present assumptions; but creative effort will be under way
only when we begin a conscious process of adapting our rules and
principles and standards 7 more directly to the service of the live,
current needs of our present-day society.
Where the nineteenth century sought the vindication of natural
78
rights, it must be our task to ascertain and evaluate interests.
Where our predecessors attempted to reconcile the claims of states
to be absolute sovereigns in their own domains, we must attempt to
reconcile their local customs and desires with the social interests
in peace and in the free development of civilization. Where earlier
jurists set out to discover principles of eternal and universal validity,
we shall be fortunate if we meet the demands of the time and the
place. We cannot break the continuity with the nineteenth century,
and we would not if we could; but not every concept that has come
74
"A rule of law is a rule of life. It is founded on the dogmas and experiences of
life; and life's dogmas and experiences are recorded in a vastly wider library than
the75 covers of law-books comprise." Wigmore, Cases on Torts, I, p. ix.
Pound, in Bibliotheca Visseriana, I, p. 89. For an example of such approach,
see78Judge Cardozo's opinion in Techt v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 241 (192o).
"There is just as truly a world-wide commerce in juristic ideas as there is a
world-wide commerce in the goods produced by economic industry." H. D.
Hazeltine in preface to Pound, Interpretations of Legal History, p. xi. But see
Oppenhein, The Future of International Law, p. 63.
770n standards as distinguished from rules in international law see Cardozo, J.,
in 78Techf v. Hughes, 229 N. Y. 222, 241 (1920).
For an interesting example from the point of view of method, see H. J. Randall, "Nationality and Naturalization," 4o Law Quarterly Review (January,
1924), P. I8.
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down to us may serve our time, and we may have to reject as well as
retain. If we prove to be unable to control all the forces which affect
the growth and application of law in our day, we shall nevertheless
abandon the notion that this law must be left to grow up as it will,
independently of what we may do. But faith in the efficacy of effort
will not alone equip us for making that effort productive. We must
know the ends that our law is to serve. before we can hope to make
it serve them.
III. METHODS OF DEVELOPING INTERNATIONAL LAW

If it be admitted that we need more adequate foundations for the
international law of the twentieth century, it must not be thought
that no steps can be taken for its improvement until such foundations
have been laid. An attempt to construct a philosophy of law apart
from its application in current life and affairs, would almost certainly
prove futile. It would result in the very unreality from which we seek
to escape. Induction and deduction must proceed fairly evenly along
parallel courses; we must live and move in a turgid stream of international events, and juristic development must ever follow its current.
Time will not wait for any re-examination of the philosophical assumptions underlying our law of nations, and scant results would be
yielded if it would. Our attention must be given to the methods of
current development, therefore, at the same time that we are seeking
to control its direction and its purpose.
We generally define the law of nations to include the body of rules
and principles and standards which various states recognize to be
binding in their relations with each other. What these rules and
principles and standards are we seek to ascertain from declarations
and dispositions in treaties and conventions, from decisions of courts,
from enunciations by foreign offices and from formulations by jurists.
Now these sources of the law seem to offer little opportunity for the
cooperation of various peoples in the conscious control of its development, and as a consequence a general pessimism dominated the thinking of the last century with reference to the fashioning of international
law to serve the needs of peoples' common life. While it was insisted
that no single nation, and even no small group of nations, could make
international law, it was also emphasized that reliance had to be
placed on sources which in their nature negatived the possibility of
efforts to promote common action. Law had to be found, not made.
Most of the sources were national in character. Enunciations of
foreign offices were frequently avowedly so, and generally the decisions
of courts dealt with questions from a national point of view, reflect-
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ing in large degree the attitudes of particular peoples. We followed7a9
fashion of ascribing to prize courts a special international character,
but our experience in the past war has shown them to be effective
agencies for serving national policy whenever their independence
might be important 5 0 The awards of arbitral tribunals have generally
been free from national bias; but it was not until the establishment of
the Permanent Court of International Justice that we came to have a
source of international law freed from the national character of court
decisions in the past, s1 and with the growth of its jurisprudence we
may hope that a new era will dawn for the judicial development of
the law along truly international lines.
The formulations by jurists have similarly tended to express the
national view-points of individuals. If there were outstanding exceptions, most writers have stated the general law in terms of local emphasis. It is perhaps a more serious thing, however, that law-writers
frequently express not the ideas of their own time, but the ideas of
some preceding generation. They tend to regard contemporaneous
thought and contemporaneous practice as more ephemeral than the
traditions received from their teachers, and hence they state as accepted that which a preceding generation thought and did.82 Imitation is a temptation to which they continually yield," and it is only
increased by their willingness to deal with doctrine as if it were always
constant and consistent.
In taking the declarations and dispositions in treaties and conventions as a source of law, however, we may feel ourselves on firmer ground;8 for treaties lack neither international character nor
contemporaneous quality. They represent the view of more than one
7
"'The court of prize is emphatically a court of the law of nations." Story, J.,
in The Schooner Adeline, 9 Cranch 244, 284 (1815). See also, Gray, J., in The
Habana, 175 U. S. 677, 7o8 (19oo).
Paquete
80
See, however, The Zamora [1916] 2 A. C. 77, 9I; Sir Erle Richards, "The
British Prize Courts and The War", British Year-Book of Int. Law, X92o-21,
p. 81ii.
Cf. W. R. Bisschop, "International Interpretation of National Case Law"
British Year-Book of Int. Law, 1923--24, p. 131.
8For this reason, it is objectionable to take too literally the notion that writers
should be treated as "trustworthy evidence of what the law really is" [was] in
their own day. Gray, J., in The Paquete Habana, 175 U. S. 677,700 (1900).
An additional reason is given in Hyde, International Law, I, p. 7, note. See also
West Rand Central Gold Mining Co. Ltd. v. The King, 2 K. B. 391,401 [1905].
83An interesting instance of this is Halleck's mistatement as to the Dubois mcident in Washington in 1856. Halleck, International Law (I86I), §21. This was
copied in Calvo, Derecho Internacional (1868), §242; in Hall, International Law
(7th ed., 1917), p. 194; in Pitt-Cobbett, Cases on International Law (2 ed.
1892), p. II4; and in Satow, Diplomatic Practice (xst ed. 1917), p. 272. It was
corrected in Satow's second edition (1922), p. 282. See for similar instances
Wheaton, International Law (2d Amer. ed. by W. B. Lawrence, 1863) note r33;
Extradition (4th ed., 1903), p. 4 note.
Clarke,
84
See Zitelmann, Die Unvollkommenheit des V6lkerrechts,(IgI9), p,. 18.
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people, and they reflect more accurately the period in which they are
drawn. If there is a sense in which a treaty must be viewed as the
concern of the parties only, if a bi-partite treaty cannot be said to
work any modification of the law of nations, there is yet a sense in
which every treaty may be said to be an act of international legislation. Unlike a court decision, unlike a foreign office's enunciation,
unlike a jurist's formulation, a treaty applies more to the future than
to the past. It prescribes a course of action for two or more peoples,
and today there are relatively few fields in which the relations of the
more active states are not governed in large degree by conventional
law. Not only has the last half-century seen a great increase in the
number of bi-partite treaties,85 but the modern multi-partite treaty
has now become a commonly accepted method of dealing with
numerous world problems which was all but unknown to the international society of a century ago.86
While we persist in the conventional statement that a legislature is
lacking for the enactment of international law, we do have today a
large body of international statute law governing the every day contacts of peoples in many fields. It has accumulated in spite of the
fact that the nineteenth century possessed very little machinery for
contributing to it. Important law-making conferences were both rare
and casual during the earlier part of the nineteenth century. The
Congress of Vienna in 1815 formulated a law for the navigation of
international rivers;7 the Conference of Paris in 1856 issued an important declaration concerning the seizure of goods at sea; the Geneva
Convention of 1864 forbade the "useless aggravation of the sufferings
of disabled men;"8 the Conference at London in 1871 reaffirmed the
binding nature of treaties; the Brussels Conference of i8go effectively
organized the world for the repression of the African slave trade. But
great as such achievements must be conceded to have been, the
method of approaching international legislative problems could hardly
have been more unsatisfactory. Cooperation depended on the chance
assembling of representatives of the Powers for some political purpose.8 9 A conference was possible only as some political exigency
8"The last century has produced more treaties than all the past". Denys P.
Myers, "The Control of Foreign Relations," ii Amer. Pol. Sci. Rev. 24, 31.
6"We are not perhaps sufficiently appreciative of the unostentatious but immediately fruitful application of rules to a host of international relations which
touch our daily lives in time of peace, and which have been put into successful
operation by common agreement." David Jayne Hill, World Organization
(1911), p. 126.
8rKaeckenbeeck, International Rivers (Grotius Soc. Pub. No. 1, 1918), p.
37 ff.
88It is notable that the United States did not become a partyto this treaty until
1882.
See 2 Treaties and Conventions of the United States, p. 1903.
89
See Oppenheim, The Future of International Law (1921), p. 33.
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made it necessary; it did not precede but followed trouble; participation was not vouchsafed to any people; and a contribution to international law was only an incident in the progress of a political
struggle. The family of nations had a family law, but no family
council for shaping it;1° each member had to steer its own course in
the hope that others would take no offense and acquiesce or follow
suit. Inter-state relations depended mainly on the contacts of governments, two by two.
It is not surprising that there should have prevailed during this
period a general theory of helplessness, so far as the making of a law
of nations was concerned. Law could not be builded, it had to be
left to grow. jurists were not social engineers, they were legal husbandmen. Men might be legislateurs, but not legisfacteurs. In the
field of municipal law, numerous legislatures were grinding away year
after year to keep abreast of changes in society; in many Western
countries ambitious and embracing codes were drawn. Yet no
similar process was thought to be possible in the international field.
Many writers commented on the absence of any legislative agency,
while few devoted themselves to its creation.
But a significant change was under way throughout the latter half
of the nineteenth century. With the changes in transportation and
communication, peoples became neighbors who had previously lived
in different worlds, and the more frequent contacts called for a greater
integration of world society. Conferences began to meet to deal with
all kinds of subjects,"' although the attempts to legislatewere isolated
and were sometimes unsuccessful. Without dealing with the more
significant political problems, they did introduce important changes
into the juridical nature of international society. The international
conference became a body which in function but not in form corresponded roughly to the municipal legislature. The legal profession
remained reluctant to receive its product into international law;
treaties were looked upon as arbitrary exceptions to the law of nations just as statutes had been inhospitably dealt with in America as
derogations from the common law; but the influence of the change
gradually came to be felt and to call for restatement of the nature of
our law of nations.
As a method for the conscious adaptation of international law to
meet the needs of international society, the conferences of the last
century remained cumbersome in the extreme. In the first place, it
9
°Mr. E. A. Harriman's view that "there is not, and there never has been, any
such
thing as the society of nations," seems extreme. 5 Boston Univ. LawRev. 16.
91
See the list of conferences in i Amer. Jour. Int. Law., 808.
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was difficult to get any conference assembled to consider possible
legislation. No central authority existed to convoke it, no machinery
existed to be availed of, no personnel trained in the work of such conferences was at hand. The initiative usually fell to some single state,
requiring careful preliminary negotiations and involving onerous
responsibilities. A restrictive agenda had to be agreed upon, and
seldom was the necessary preparatory work done to assure successful
collaboration." When once it was assembled, the issue of a single,
spasmodic conference was often in doubt. Not until various unions
were established, did periodicity begin to appear. Even after the
inauguration of the Hague Conferences, their continuance remained
very precarious; the second Hague Conference was possible only
after delicate negotiations,93 and in spite of its voeu it was still uncertain whether a third conference would be held when the clouds of
1914 enveloped all international cooperation in a haze of bewildering
doubt. 4 The four International Conferences of American States in
189o, 1902, 19o6, and igio succeeded in maintaining a degree of continuity, however, and at the Fifth Conference in 1923, plans were
made for a sixth Conference within five years.95
A new era seems to have been begun with the end of the war in
i9 9. The first five years following the Treaty of Versailles saw the
establishment of a permanent and continuous machinery for general
conference by fifty-five nations. An agency exists, at last, for assembling international conferences and for enabling them to work smoothly and effectively when assembled. Periodical meetings of representatives of the Powers have now become an accepted thing, and
whereas only two conferences at The Hague resulted from a generation of effort, each of the annual conferences since 1919 has included
the representatives of more Powers than were represented at either
of the Hague Conferences. A revolution in method has occurred, and
if it is designed chiefly for the ordering of the political relations of
states, it promises also much greater cooperation in the moulding and
developing of the law of nations as well. If the new method has not
yet been accepted universally, its influence promises to be far-reaching and the consequences to international law may be very great. It
has become possible, at last, for attention to be fixed on the legislative
'2See Higgins, Hague Peace Conferences, p. 523.
9Note, for instance, the difficulty experienced in assembling the Second Hague
Conference. Scott, Hague Conferences, pp. 88-io6.
94Negotiations for a Third Conference were hardly under way when the War
began in 1914, though the conference had been proposed for 1915, and on June 22,
See U. S.
1914, the United States had proposed a postponement until 196.

Foreign
Relations, 1914, p. IO.
9

See Report of the Delegates of the United States, p. 230.
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needs of world society; willingness and energy may be mobilized to
meet them; and the cooperative legislative effort which is beginning
may make over the international law of the twentieth century.
With this situation resulting from the creation of the League of
Nations, it has become possible to approach the development of international law with renewed energy. Various methods of procedure
which have previously been discussed only unofficially have now come
into the realm of official planning. The new Conference machinery is
in a sense successor to the Hague Conferences, and in five years it has
realized their chief aim by establishing the Permanent Court of International justice.9" This Court offers promise that the judge-made
part of international law will not be neglected in the future, and by
the fifteen opinions which it has handed down in three years a valuable beginning has been made which has brought to the Court the
confidence of foreign offices as well as of the legal profession throughout the world.
On the legislative side, however, the r6le of the new agencies which
have been established has not been so clearly marked out for them.
It has been insistently demanded that they be used for the "codification" of international law. The term "codification" has been a
97
popular one, especially among laymen, since the days of Bentham,
and since the War it has served many uses. In fact, it has been so
loosely used in recent years that the edge has been worn off its meaning, and in many minds the task of enacting an all-embracing code of
the law of nations has come to appear as a simple expedient which
must be realized as a condition to the functioning of the Permanent
Court of International Justice.9 8
As I have attempted to point out on another occasion,9 9 "codification" is used in connection with international law in three senses,
9
6The framers of the Statute of the Court took as the basis of their work the
draft elaborated at the second Hague Conference. See Hudson, Permanent
Court of International Justice (1925), p. 215.
9On Bentham's proposal, see Nys, Notes In~dites de Bentham sur le Droit
International, i Law Quar. Rev. 225; Carnegie Endowment Year-Book, 1923, pp.

242-247. On early discussion of codification in America, see Pound, "The Place
of Judge Story in the Making of American Law", Cambridge Hist. Soc. Proc.,
VII,
p. 45.
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and the three are often confused. It is occasionally used to denote
the harmonizing of the municipal law of various countries, by the preparation and enactment of uniform statutes covering certain fields of
law in which divergence leads to difficulties. The "passion for uniformity" may be sometimes responsible for the insistence on codification of this sort,'00 but more frequently it results from appreciation
of the practical disadvantages of differences. Between nations, these
disadvantages are as great in certain fields as between the various
states and provinces of North America.. The importance of the work
of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in the United States since 1892101 and the Conference of Commissioners on Uniformity of Legislation in Canada since 1918'1 can hardlybe
overestimated. Within limits, a similar service might be performed
for the various states in international society, and some attempts are
being made in this direction. The Inter-American High Commission,
created by the First Pan-American Financial Conference in Washington in 19i5,1w has labored to build a uniform commercial law and uniform laws for the protection of literary and industrial property in the
American hemisphere;'1 andeits efforts have contributed to the ratification of various conventions' as well as to the work of the International Conference of American States which also concerns itself
with uniformity of laws in American countries. Much has been accomplished in this way toward the unification of private law. The Conferences at The Hague in iio and 1912 wrestled with the unification
""0See Judge Moore's interesting paper on "The Passion For Uniformity",
reprinted in International Law and Some Current Illusions (1924), P. 316 ft.
10'This Conference holds annual meetings; it consists of commissioners from each
of the states and territories of the United States, and in thirty-three states or
territories these commissioners have official appointments under legislative
authority. The Conference has already approved thirty-eight drafts of uniform
acts, of which one-the Negotiable Instruments Act-has been enacted in fiftyone American jurisdictions. See the 1924 Handbook of the National Conference
of Commissioners
on Uniform State Laws, p. 28.
102This Conference resembles the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in many ways. Nine provinces are represented, and the
Conference has adopted eight uniform acts, two of which have been enacted in six
provinces. See Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Meeting, 1924, p. 8.
103U. S. Foreign Relations, 1915, p. 20.
,o4When the Commission met in Buenos Ayres in April, 1916, it "included in its
deliberations the question of international agreements on uniform labor legislation; uniformity of regulations governing the classifications and analysis of
petroleum and other mineral fuels with reference to national development policies. . .and uniformity of laws for the protection of merchant creditors."
John Bassett Moore, The Work of the International High Commission, Senate
Document 261, 66th Congress, 2d Session, p. 5. The "Program of Activities"
published by the Commission on October 22, 1923, is much more ambitious.
loiFor instance, the Conventions on the treatment of commercial travellers
which the United States has concluded with Colombia, Guatemala, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Salvador, Uruguay and Venezuela. See 3 U. S. Treaties and
Conventions, pp.

2541, 2670, 2780, 2791, 2800, 2826, 2862, 2867.
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of the law of bills of exchange, for example; and the results have been
so extensive that Judge John Bassett Moore reported in 1920, "We
seem to be rapidly approaching the time when, so far as concerns bills
of exchange, there will, in effect, be only two systems in use in the
Western Hemisphere, based respectively, on The Hague rules of 1912
and the United States uniform negotiable instruments act."'10 The
Comit6 Maritime International, a non-official body, has devoted itself since 1897 to the unification of maritime law, and it has seen some
fruition of its efforts in the work of the International Maritime ConBut the
1922 and 1923.10
ferences held at Brussels in 1905, 190,
most striking activity directed toward uniform laws in any field is
that of the International Labor Organization which was created in
1gg,
under Part XIII of the Treaty of Versailles. Whereas before
the War a whole generation of effort gave us but two international
labor conventions, the new organization has already succeeded in
putting into effect between various countries sixteen conventions
08
relating to conditions of labor."
The importance of such unification cannot be exaggerated; but it
is by no means possible for it to cover the whole field of the law of
nations, and in the main such ambitious attempts must be confined to
fields in which national legislation already exists in most countries.
In a second sense, "codification" is used to denote a systematic
restatement of the existing customary law of nations, to which would
be given formal legislative sanction. It is urged that such a restatement would simplify and clarify the content of the law, and introduce
greater certainty into its application. The need is felt to be increased
° i0Moore, The Work of the International High Commission, Senate Document
No. 261, 66th Congress, 2d Sess., p. 6. For the progress of The Hague Rules in
other countries, and the prospect of extending it, see the Report on Unification of
Laws Relating to Bills of Exchange, made to the Economic Committee of the
League of Nations, 1923.
Judge de Bustamante has recently published a very illuminating volume on
the codification of private international law, de Bustamante y Sirven, Proyecto
de Codigo de Derecho Internacional Privado (Habana, 1925).
10'The Conference of 1922 framed conventions concerningthe limitation of the
maritime
liens and
mortgages, and bills of lading. These
liability
of shipowners,
draft conventions
were again
considered
by a sub-committee at Brussels, October
at
1923. See the Procin-Verbaux of Conference on Maritime Law published
6-9,
Brussels;
Trade Information Bulletin No. 297 of U. S. Dept. of Commerce.

"The uniformity of principles and interpretation of maritime

law" was also an
item in the agenda of the Fifth International Conference of American
States at
Santiago, in 1923.
losForseethe
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February,
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theprogress
bulletinof published
with
"Industrial
and Labouruntil
Information",
February 23, I925, vol. XIII, No. 8. The Hours of Work Convention of I9I9 is
the most important, on which see an important study by Herbert Fes, "The

Attempt to Establish the Eight Hour Day by International Action," 39 Polit-
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by the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice, and the desirability of enlarging its jurisdiction.10 9 It would seem
clear that no field of law is "ripe" for restatement in this sense unless
it has reached a stage of maturity in which it is relatively free from
important conflicts as to its provisions; and the query arises whether
much of our law of nations can be said to have advanced to that stage.
Such a restatement as that recently undertaken with reference to
certain topics of American municipal law by the American Institute
of Law, has been closely confined to topics which have reached an
advanced stage, though it is not proposed that the results will be enacted in statutes." 0 Certainly a concise statement of the law is always
convenient, and if the law of nations could be "stated in a concise and
accurate form and within the compass of a volume" it would be a
boon to every scholar and jurist. Perhaps it is true that it would
create new controversies,' and it might tend to some rigidity,1u but it
would also increase the "cognoscibility" of our law and possibly therefore increase confidence in its administration. Yet it would be unfortunate indeed if such a restatement were made to include matters
as to which competition of important interests might still be operating, for the result would only be a prolongation of the struggle. Such
a mistake was made by the London Naval Conference in 19O9, when
the Declaration of London,'" which was said to "correspond in substance with the generally recognized principles of international law,"
was made to contain so many new dispositions as to which no wide
agreement existed.
Moreover, the acceptance of such a restatement by different countries should be based upon a uniform understanding of the juridical
and philosophical bases of international law, and it may be questioned
whether such an understanding exists today with respect to much of
the content of our existing law. Dr. Scott has stated that "any standard treatise on international law, if abridged in the form of a statute,
would be a fairly acceptable code of international law;"" 4but there is
such a wide difference between the standard treatises, they are so far
from accepting any consistent theory, that it is difficult to see how
such a course would add to our convenience. And to the extent that
10sSee Dr. James Brown Scott's report in the Year-Book of the Carnegie Enof International Peace, 1923, Pp. 236-7.
dowment
0
" "We are not seeking to formulate a code of lawfor enactment bylegislatures."
President George W. Wickersham, in the Minutes of the Second Annual Meeting
of the American Institute of Law, 1924, P. 21.
UlOppenheim, International Law (3d ed.), I, p. 43.
n2p. J. Baker, in the British Year-Book of International Law, 1924, p. 48.
MU. S. Foreign Relations, 19o9, p. 318.
"'Carnegie Endowment Year-Book for 1923, p. 252.
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these treatises are standard, they may serve our purposes without any
enactment of their provisions into a code.
It is for these reasons that a global restatement of the existing law
seems to many people undesirable, and that the very ambitious efforts
of the International Conferences of American States may not promise
the best results. It was at the Second Pan-American Conference in
115
1901-2, in Mexico, that such activities were first proposed,
and the
Third Conference at Rio de Janeiro succeeded in elaborating a convention creating an international Committee of Jurists to codify both
private and public international law." 6 Many difficulties arose before
a meeting of this commission was held, and it was postponed from
1907 to i912; a second meeting, postponed since 1914, is now in prospect for the current year. The six committees organized in X912 were
to cover a very wide range; their assignments included maritime war
and the duties of neutrals, war on land and claims growing out of it,
international law in time of peace, pacific settlement of disputes,
status of aliens and domestic relations and successions, and other
matters of private international law including penal laws." 7
The Fifth Conference at Santiago has now carried the movement a
step furtherby recommending the reestablishment of the committees
appointed at Rio de Janeiro. It also recommended that "in the domain of international law, the codification should be gradual and
progressive" based on a project of Sefior Alejandro Alvarez entitled
"The Codification of American International Law.""" In preparation
for the c925 meeting, the Governing Board of the Pan-American
Union sought the cooperation of the American Institute of International Law," 9 which proceeded to elaborate thirty or more projects
of conventions.2 0 On March 2, 1925, Secretary Hughes presented
thirty-one projects to the Governing Board of the Pan-American
Union, which transmitted them to the various American Governments. Mr. Hughes stated very sanguinely that "we are on the
threshold of accomplishment in the most important endeavor of the
human race to lift itself out of the savagery of strife into the domain
of law breathing the spirit of amity and justice."''
These projects
'The Convention signed at Mexico on January 27, 1902, was not ratified.
This convention provided for a "committee of five American and two European

jurists." See Minutes and Documents of the second Pan-American Conference,
p. 716.
" 67Actas, Tercera Conferencia Internacional Americana, p. 635.
" See the report of the American Delegates to the Meeting of the Commission at
Rio
4
118de Janeiro, U. S. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 26.
See the report of the American Delegates to the Fifth Conference, p. 133.
9
"1
2 Carnegie Endowment Year-Book, 1924, P. 90.
Preliminary drafts in Spanish were published in 6 Revista de Derecho Internacional, 242 ff. (November, 1924).
m'See the current press release of the Department of State.
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seem to cover a very large field, and it may be doubted whether the
American nations are ready to codify such subjects as the "fundamental bases of international law" and a general "declaration as to the
rights and duties of nations." Such restatement is not likely to effect
much clarification, and it might have the effect of fastening on the
growing law of this century the dead hand of a discarded philosophy.
The third sense in which "codification" is used, and perhaps the
meaning usually given to the term in America, has little in common
either with the unification of national laws or with the restatement of
existing law; it proceeds frankly on the basis of new legislation and
the making of new law. The popular agitation for "codification" is
based on dissatisfactions which only legislation can remedy; "codification" usually means therefore the enactment of a new law based
upon some favorite principle, such as the outlawry of war, and few
advocates get beyond the statement of such a principle. It is a special
piece of legislation which is demanded, and the term "code" is used
because of its general appeal. "Codification" in this sense is a violent
misnomer, as Professor Baker has so brilliantly pointed out.
Now a great deal of legislation has been enacted during the past
fifty years. It was only in x875 that the Universal Postal Union was
established, and its constitution is today a basis for a part of the
law of nations. When David Dudley Field published his "Outlines
of a Code" in 1872, many subjects were still untouched as to which
legislation has since been achieved. 122 It is not general legislation,
most of it; it is not declaratory of basic principles; it is not primarily
the work of lawyers. It represents the result of persistent attempts
to meet specific problems of international society in a very practical
way, and it has frequently been the work of the experts in various
governments who were in closest touch with the international actualities which made legislation desirable. Multi-partite treaties have
been entered into by the United States, covering a variety of subjects
which were wholly outside the purview of the law of nations a halfcentury ago. These dispositions for ordering international life are
perhaps a more significant part of the law than many of the doctrines
which we have inherited from the seventeenth century.
If the world is to attempt any codification with the new methods
and machinery which fifty-five nations have established, it would
seem to be along this third line that most progress can be made. The
=Field devoted Part III of his "Outliness" to what he called "Uniform Regulations for Mutual Convenience", the subtitles of which were: Shipping, Imposts, Quarantine, Railways, Telegraphs, Postal Service, Patents, Trademarks,
Copyrights, Money, Weights and Measures, Longitude and Time, and Sea

Signals.
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League of Nations must be used to further legislation with respect to
specific problems. It must continue the process inaugurated in the
latter part of the nineteenth century. It must develop a functional
law of nations to meet the demands which the dwindling of the world
has created.
The proposal to use the League of Nations machinery for developing international law was made during the first year of the League's
existence. The Advisory Committee of Jurists which drafted the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, meeting at
The Hague in I92o,'" adopted the following recommendation:12 4
I. A new inter-State Conference, to carry on the work of
the two first Conferences at The Hague, should be called as soon
as possible for the purpose of:
i. Re-establishing the existing rules of the Law of Nations,
more especially and in the first place, those affected by
the events of the recent War;
2. Formulating and approving the modifications and additions rendered necessary or advisable by the War, and
by the changes in the conditions of international life
following upon this great struggle;
3. Reconciling divergent opinions, and bringing about a
general understanding concerning the rules which have
been the subject of controversy;
4. Giving special consideration to those points which are
not at the present time adequately provided for, and of
which a definite settlement by general agreement is required in the interests of international justice.
II. That the Institute of International Law, the American
Institute of International Law, the Union juridique internationale, the International Law Association and the Iberian Institute
of Comparative Law, should be invited to adopt any method,
or use any system of collaboration that they may think fit, with
a view to the preparation of draft plans to be submitted, first
to the various Governments, and then to the Conference, for the
realisation of this work.
III. That the new Conference should be called the Conference for the Advancement of International Law.
IV. That this Conference should be followed by periodical
similar Conferences, at intervals sufficiently short to enable the
work undertaken to be continued, in so far as it may be incomplete, with every prospect of success.
The statement of purposes of the proposed conference was open to
many objections. To reestablish the existing rules of the law of
121

The recommendation as proposed by Baron Descamps and Mr. Elihu Root
was adopted after apparently little or no discussion in the Committee. See,
Proc~s-Verbaux of the Advisory Committee of Jurists, pp. 230-231, 497, 5o6,
519-520,
747-748.
124
Records of First Assembly, Meetings of Committees, I, pp. 422-464.
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nations, affected by the events of the war, would have meant a reaffirmation of obsolescent rules which might have had serious consequences. Of course it was not then possible to re-state the laws of war
as they had been understood prior to 1914, and certainly undesirable
if possible. The formulation of modifications and additions rendered
necessary by the War would have been a gigantic task, demanding all
the detachment that could have been mustered; but 1920 was certainly no time for such an undertaking. The world sought to get away
from thinking about war, and it is indeed questionable whether any
revision of the rules governing the conduct of war which might then
have been framed would have been worth the ink and paper expended
on them. 25 For the victorious allies would most certainly have stated
the new law in terms of their recent practice and contentions; the conferences would have been controlled by them, probably to the exclusion of Germany and Russia; and the prevailing psychology would
have given scant consideration to the interests of neutrals, if indeed
any powerful state which had remained neutral during the War would
have been able to defend them. The reconciliation of divergent
opinions involves the acceptance of some general philosophy of state
relations, and seldom in the world's history has such a philosophy been
so lacking as in I92O. "A general understanding concerning the rules
which have been the subject of controversy" would probably not
have been shared either by Germany or by Russia, and it might have
expressed views which most nations will have repudiated a few
decades hence.
What such a conference following so closely after the War might
have been tempted to do was demonstrated in the work of the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armament in 1922. That Conference drafted a treaty "relative to the protection of the lives of
neutrals and non-combatants at sea in time of war and to prevent the
use in war of noxious gases and chemicals," which purported to state
"established law" as to submarines and to forbid the use in war of
"asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases.""2 6 The treaty was signed by
five Powers, but it has not yet been ratified, and possibly may never
be. It breathes all the hostility to Germany which has accumulated
in allied countries during the submarine warfare. As to the prohibition of the use of gases in warfare, if ever any such attempt to abolish
the use of weapons can succeed against the belief of military men in
225
Sir Henry Maine assigned as one of the reasons for the failure of the Brussels
Convention of 1874 "that it was commenced too soon after one of the greatest of
modern wars, which probably never had a rival in the violence of the passions
which it excited." Maine, International Law (1888), pp. 128-129.
1263 U. S. Treaties and Conventions, p. 3116.
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their military efficacy, the preparations now under way in various
countries seem to indicate that opinion today is not headed in that
direction. The Washington Conference also created a Commission
of Jurists to consider amendments in other laws of war,ur and the
states represented agreed to "confer as to the acceptance of its
report;" but though the committee terminated its labors in 1923,2 8 no
announcement has been made of any such conferring.
These considerations would point to the extreme undesirability of
such a course as the Advisory Committee of Jurists suggested.1s In
the Council3I 0 andAssembly 3' respectful consideration was given to it,
but neither body approved it. A resolution reported by a committee
of the latter was limited to inviting the Council "to address to the
most authoritative of the institutions which are devoted to the study
of international law a request to consider what would be the best
methods of cooperative work to adopt for the more precise definition
and more complete coordination of the rules of international law
which are to be applied in the mutual relations of states.113 2 But the
First Assembly refused to go even so far133 and the Second Assembly
in 192i was no more favorable to it."3 This reluctance to undertake
any codification dealing with the laws of war expressed only a wise
recognition of the unpreparedness of a war-weary world to foist its psychology and its philosophy on future generations. The new machinery
of the League of Nations was to be employed for developing the law
of nations, but in a wholly different direction.
Attention was given first of all to the general conventions which
had issued from the Paris Peace Conference, and efforts were made to
encourage their ratification. 13 5 Already in 1920, the attention of the
"Ibid., p. 3139, 3140.

128

The report of the Committee was published at The Hague in 1923.
'2Yet Secretary Hughes stated to the Governing Board of the Pan-American
Union on March 2, 1925: "It is regrettable that there should have been such
long delay in carrying forward this plan which had the full support of the Advisory
Committee." See also Frances Kellor, Security Against War, 11, 449 ff.
"30 Records of First Assembly, Meetings of Committees, I, p. 48o.
'Ibid., pp. 326-8, 588-9.
2
"3
Records of First Assembly, Meetings of Committees, vol. I, p. 589.
133Viscount Cecil, representing the South African Union, opposed any such
action on the ground that "we have not got to a stage yet where it is desirable to
consider the codification of international law;" he considered the proposal a
"very dangerous project at this stage in the world's history", for we have not
"arrived at sufficient calmness of the public mind to undertake" such a step
"without
very serious results to the future of international law".
134
Records of Second Assembly, Meetings of Committees, I, 116, 308, 370.
ruThe Paris Peace Conference drew up a Convention Revising the General Act
of Berlin of February 26, 1885 and the General Act and Declaration of Brussels of
July 2, i8go, a Convention Relating to the Liquor Traffic in Africa, a Convention for the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, and a Convention
for the Regulation of Aerial Navigation-all of which were signed but not ratified
on behalf of the United States. See 3 U. S. Treaties and Conventions, 3739,.3820.
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Council and Assembly had been directed to certain inadequacies of
the existing law with respect to particular fields of international contacts. The Labor Conferences inaugurated their work by adopting
six labor conventions at Washington in i919, and that work has been
continued in annual conferences since.1 6 A Passport Conferencewas
held at Paris in 192o, and a Financial Conference at Brussels in the
same year. A permanent organization was established to deal with
questions relating to transit and communications, and the Conference
at Barcelona in 1921 adopted three conventions and an important
declaration,3 7 to which the Conference at Geneva in 1923 added four
more Conventions. 38 A Conference was held at Geneva in 1 9 21 to
consider the suppression of the traffic in women and children, and its
recommendations were embodied in a convention drawn up by the
Second Assembly in that same year, revising and bringing up to date
the treaty of igio." 9 Work was begun by the Economic and Financial
Committee on various questions, including the unification of the law
as to bills of exchange and the recognition of arbitration clauses in
commercial contracts, and a protocol on the latter subject has now
been signed by a number of states. 40 In 1922, a Conference devised an
arrangement for issuing certificates of identity to Russian refugees.' 4'
A special international Conference in 1923 drafted anew convention
on obscene publications supplementing the treaty of i91o, which has
since been quite generally signed and ratified.'4 A Conference on
Customs Formalities in 1923 succeeded in elaborating an important
treaty on that subject.4 3 After a great deal of preparatory work, two
Opium Conferences were assembled in 1924, and a new agreement was
signed on February i, 1925, followed by the signature of a new opium
convention on February

19, 1925.

When it became clear that the St.

Germain Convention on traffic in arms could not receive general acceptance, a new Conference was planned to deal with that subject and
its convening is now set for May 4, 1925. In short, the first five years
of the League of Nations were years of constant legislative activity,
"'Sixteen labor conventions have been adopted by the Conference. It has
also pushed for the ratification of the Berne Convention Prohibiting the Manufacture of Matches with White Phosphorus. See the Report of the Director of
the37International Labor Office, 1924, p. 96 ff.
1 League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 7, PP. 12, 36, 66, 74.
"'Second General Conference on Communications and Transit, Official Instruments
approved by the Conference, pp. 3-43.
' 39League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 9, P. 416.
"OLeague of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 27, P. 157. The possibility of a convention on double taxation and tax evasion has been considered by a committee of
technical
experts which reported to the Financial Committee on February 7, 3925.
14
League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. 13, P. 238.
4
'342League of 'Nations Treaty Series, vol.27, p. 213.
League of Nations Document C. 678 M. 241. 1924. II.
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the fruits of which far surpass those of any previous period of the same
length in the world's history.'" The process cannot be called "codification," unless that term is used solely with reference to legislative
activity directed to meeting immediate needs; but it seems fraught
with more important consequences for the future of a law-governed
world society than any codification movement in the past.
It was the success of this approach over a period of almost five years
which led the Swedish Government to propose to the Fifth Assembly
in September, 1924, a course of action which might serve to make it
certain that such activities would not neglect those fields of international life in which the situation might be ready for new legislation.
Baron Marks von Wfirtemberg therefore offered the following resolu-

tion on September 8, 1924:"5
The Assembly:
Taking note of the report of the Council on the work accomplished by the League of Nations for the conclusion of agreements on matters of international law; and
Recognizing the desirability of incorporating in international
conventions or in other international instruments certain items
or subjects of international law which lend themselves to this
procedure, such conventions or such instruments to be finally
established by international conferences convened under the auspices of the League of Nations, after preliminary consultation
with Governments and experts:
Requests the Council:
(i) To invite the Members of the League of Nations to
signify to the Council the items or subjects of international
law, public or private, which in their opinion may be usefully
examined with a view to their incorporation in international
conventions or in other international instruments as indicated
above;
(2)
To address a similar invitation to the most authoritative
organisations which have devoted themselves to the study and
development of international law;
(3) To examine, after the necessary consultations, the measures which may be taken with respect to the various suggestions
presented in order to enable the League of Nations to contribute
in the largest possible measure to the development of international law;
(4) To present a report to the next Assembly on the measures
taken in execution of this resolution.
After a careful study of the Swedish resolution, in the First Com'"All of this activity is ignored, however, by certainAmerican writers who are
the last survivors of the movement for continuing the Hague Conferences. See
Scott, "Should There Be a Third Hague Peace Conference?", Advocate of Peace,
January, 1925, p. 27.
"'Records of Fifth Assembly, Meetings of Committees, Minutes of First Committee, p. 97.
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mittee of the Assembly, the following v6rsion was adopted by unani-

mous vote on September

22, 1924:146

The Assembly:
Considering that the experience of five years has demonstrated
the valuable services which the League of Nations can render
towards rapidly meeting the legislative needs of international
relations, and recalling particularly the important conventions
already drawn up with respect to communications and transit,
the simplification of Customs formalities, the recognition of
arbitration clauses in commercial contracts, international labour
legislation, the suppression of the traffic in women and children,
the protection of minorities, as well as the recent resolutions
concerning legal assistance for the poor;
Desirous of increasing the contribution of the League of
Nations to the progressive codification of international law:
Requests the Council:
To convene a committee of experts, not merely possessing
individually the required qualifications but also, as a body,
representing the main forms of civilisation and the principal
legal systems of the world. This committee, after eventually
consulting the most authoritative organisations which have devoted themselves to the study of international law, and without
trespassing in any way upon the official initiative which may
have been taken by particular States, shall have the duty:
(i)
To prepare a provisional list of the subjects of international law the regulation of which by international agreement
would seem to be the most desirable and realisable at the present
moment; and
(2) After communication of the list by the Secretariat to
the Governments of States, whether Members of the League or
not, for their opinion, to examine the replies received; and
(3) To report to the Council on the questions which are sufficiently ripe and on the procedure which might be followed with
a view to preparing eventually for conferences for their solution.
On December I, 1924, the Council meeting in Rome set up this
Committee,147 and its first meeting has now been set for April 1, 1925.
It is not the task of this Committee to propose the substantive
changes to be made in existing law; still less is it to draft any new provisions for a code. It is to "prepare a provisional list of the subjects
of international law the regulation of which by international agreement would seem to be most desirable at the present moment," and
after this list has been studied by the various Governments of the
world, of members of the League and non-members of the League,
"to report to the Council on the questions which are sufficiently ripe"
116Verbatim
Record of Fifth Assembly, Seventeenth Plenary Meeting, p. 5.
147League of Nations Official Journal, February 1925, p. 143.
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for legislation. 48 Future attempts to make adequate the law of nations
of the twentieth century are not to depend on chance, therefore; 149
they will be the result of a deliberated and planned course of action.
The world's intelligence is at last being focussed on the job of making
our law of nations fit our time; conscious effort is to supersede our
attitude of laissez-faireand our conception of automatic progress; and
the twentieth century is to make a law, good or bad, according to its
own lights.
Now the measure of success which will attend this new method will
largely depend on the procedure followed, and the field is so unexplored that many problems of procedure may give difficulty. The
Benthamites did not find it "difficult to devise how the nations of the
civilized world might concur in the framing of a code,"'u 0 and many
The task has been imlaymen seem to share that notion today.'
mensely simplified by the establishment of the machinery which we
call the League of Nations, but it is by no means simple even with
this new aid.
First of all, there is the problem as to how formulations will be
initiated. Should they be begun by official conferences, or should such
conferences await the action of unofficial bodies? President Coolidge
recently declared that "we can look more hopefully, in the first
instance, for research and studies that are likely to be productive of
results, to a cooperation among representatives of the bar and members of international law institutes and societies, than to a conference
of those who are technically representative of their respective governments."'12 The work of the Institute of International Law since
i875,"' of the Comit6 Maritime International since 1897, and of the
American Institute of International Law has paved the way for some
restatement of the existing law, which might be of value even if it
148Cf. the provision in the Final Act of the Second Peace Conference at The
Hague in 1907, suggesting that a preparatory committee to be created before the
meeting of a Third Conference be charged with the task "of ascertaining what
subjects are ripe for embodiment in an international regulation." 2 U. S. Treaties
and Conventions, p. 2369, 2379.
149"It has always hitherto been a more or less happy chance which has controlled
international legislation. Of conscious legislative consideration and deliberation,
based on far-reaching, thorough-going preparation, there is no trace." Oppenheim, The Future of International Law (1921), p. 33.
Mill, Essays on Government, etc. (1824), p. 27.
'OJames
151"It may take two years to prepare such a code. Senator Knox thought it
would
take five years." Levinson, Outlawry of War, p. 18.
8
6'Annual Message to Congress, December 3, 1924. New York Times, December5 4, 1924, p. 8.
' The resolutions of the Institute were collected in a very useful volumebyDr.
James Brown Scott, published by the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace in 1916. The work of the International Law Association and of various

national societies of international law should also be mentioned, though few of the
latter are very effective.
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were not given the sanction of a binding convention. But new legis-

lation must proceed from official conferences. The Assembly of the
League of Nations is such a conference, though it seldom takes any
action which commits the Members of the League to new law. The
statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, for example,
was drawn by the Assembly; but it was promulgated by a special
protocol which all members and certain non-members of the League
were free to sign or not to sign. More frequently, the Assembly has
engineered the necessary preliminaries, set up bodies to do the preparatory work, and left final formulation to conferences called ad hoc.
In such conferences, non-members of the League are frequently represented,1 and conventions signed are usually opened to the signature
or adhesion of states not represented. 5 The League machinery thus
seems adequate for the purpose of assembling conferences, in spite of
its lacking universal support; and it may greatly facilitate also the
convoking by various governments of conferences not held under
League auspices.5 6
Such international conferences must inevitably lack many of the
features of a national legislative assembly. Their distinguishing
characteristic is the necessity for unanimity which, if it limits the
sphere of possible agreement, also extends the range of possible
acceptance of the results agreed upon. The Hague Conferences were
much criticized because of the requirement of unanimity, and Professor A. Pearce Higgins thought that "the Third Conference will, if it
desires to avoid the excessive waste of time of the Second, be com2

"The United States was represented at the Conference on Obscene Publications and the Conference on Customs Formalities in 1923, and at the Opium
Conference in 1924; and it will be represented at the Arms Traffic Conference in
1925. See also Hudson, American Cooperation with the League of Nations,
World
Peace Foundation Pamphlets, vol. VII, No. I.
' 5 The following non-members were represented at the Conference on Customs
Formalities in 1923: United States of America, Germany, Egypt. The Convention of November 3, 1923, was opened to signature or accession by any state
represented at the Conference, by any Member of the League, or by any state invited by the Council. On December o, 1923, the Council invited the following
states to sign or accede: Ecuador, Mexico, Turkey and Russia.
The opium convention signed at Geneva on February 19, 1925, has been opened
to the signature of Soviet Russia, Monaco, San Marino, Afghanistan, Ecuador,
Hedjaz, Iceland, Lichtenstein, and the Sudan-all non-members of the League.
N. Y. Times, March I6, 1925.
The restrictive provision in the Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes of 1899, as to the adhesion of states not represented at the Conference, was pretty clearly a mistake, and made unnecessary difficulty in admitting
the156South American countries to the Second Hague Conference.
For example, the Conference for the Revision of the Convention forthe Protection of Industrial Property, convoked by the Netherlands Government for
October, 1925, has been facilitated by the work of the Economic Committee and
by a resolution of the Fifth Assembly. See Verbatim Record of the Fifth Assembly, September 25, 1924, p. 3 Report of the Economic Committee, September 5, 1924, P. i6.
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pelled to abandon the principle of requiring unanimous votes, or to
abandon entirely the principle of voting."' 57 Judge John Bassett
Moore, speaking in 1914, thought that the "requirement of unanimity" was the "chief obstacle to the efficacy" of establishing rules by
legislative acts, and it seemed to him "altogether desirable that a rule
should be adopted whereby it may no longer be possible for a single
state to stand in the way of international legislation."'5 8 It was the
same feeling that led the American League to Enforce Peace in 1915
to include in its program a provision that "conferences between the
signatory Powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and
codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall
signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in
the decisions of the judicial tribunal."'5 9 The proposal has been put
in even stronger terms by Professor Philip Baker who would have conventions adopted by law-making conferences to include provisions
that "the ratification of every signatory Power would be assumed,
unless within a certain fixed period it informed the other signatory
Powers that it did not intend to ratify."' 6 0
Such proposals may be thought to push too far the assimilation of
In the latter, a
international conferences to national parliaments.'
statute attains the force of law from the time of its enactment, and
the necessity of agreement makes it essential that some kind of majority prevail; but in the former, a convention that is voted is to be
signed ad referendum, and a state represented is not bound unless it
signs and later ratifies. Each state has an interest in the drafting of
the provisions of the convention which is to be open to its later acceptance, and in few cases where universality is desired is it advisable
to determine upon those provisions without unanimous agreement.
Since a later choice is open, a majority will only bind a majority.
Indeed, voting has not the same significance as in national parliaments.'62 Noses are seldom counted in an international conference,
though important matters of procedure are frequently determined by

' 57Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences (19G9), p. 523. See also F. C. Hicks,
"The Equality of States and The Hague Conferences", 2 Amer. Jour. Int. Law,
530, 560.

(1924). P. 303.
15OProceedings of the First Annual National Assemblage of the League to

15Moore, International Law and Some Current Illusions

Enforce Peace (1916), p. 8.

1'Baker, "The Codification of International Law", British Year-Book of Inter-

national Law, 1924, p. 63.

"'6See Scott, The Hague Conferences (I9O9), I, p. 36; Scott, Hague Conventions
and Declarations (1915), p. x.

ISee Denys P. Myers, "Representation in Public International Organs", 8
Amer. Jour. Int. Law 81.
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majority vote. 1 3 Most conventions provide for their coming into
force between the states that ratify, even though some of the signatories fail to ratify, and a dissentient state sometimes prefers escape
through non-ratification to voting against the clear majority.' On the
whole, therefore, the requirement of unanimity does not greatly detract from the effectiveness of international conferences. Yet in
some recent conferences it has been found possible to get away from
it. The special composition of the International Labor Conferences
led to the provision that a draft convention might be adopted by a
two-thirds vote, a member being bound only to bring it "before the
authority or authorities within whose competence the matter lies, for
the enactment of legislation or other action."1
The General Conference on Communications and Transit has followed the innovation
of the Labor Organization, and requires only a majority of two-thirds
"for the final adoption by the Conference of a proposal mentioned in
the agenda."' 68 The rules of the Fifth International Conference of
American States provide that resolutions or motions may be approved
by "the affirmative vote of an absolute majority of the delegations."8 7
A second problem as to procedure in international conferences
grows out of their size and the difficulty of their engaging in cooperative deliberation. Differences of language make their proceedings
slow, 1 8 and it is essential that an experienced staff be assembled forit;
89
but this seems possible only if permanent organization is maintained.
The Secretariat of the League of Nations meets a great want in this
respect. The exchanges of delegates must also be preceded by careful
preparatory work, and many have been the complaints in the past
'6See the rules of procedure of the Assemblyof the League of Nations, rule i9.
Record of First Assembly, Plenary Meetings, p. 240.
'"See Oppenheim, The Future of International Law, p. 3o ff.
'6Article 405 of the Treaty of Versailles. The labor conventions are not signed
by representatives; for the controversy between the French Government and the
International Labor Office over the ratification of unsigned conventions, see
Report of the Director of the International Labor Office, 1924, p. III. By the
action of the Sixth Conference in 1924, a procedure is envisaged by which, before
a draft convention is promulgated for action by the Members, it may receive the
approval of two-thirds of two successive conferences. See Proceedings of Sixth
International Labor Conference (1924), I, p. 223.
"'Article 12 of the rules for the organization of the General Conferences. League
of Nations Document C. 15. M. io. 1921. VIII.
"'Article 17 of the regulations. See Report of American Delegates, p. 38. The
Second, Third and Fourth Conferences had a similar rule. See also the draft
regulations of the International Commission of Jurists, which met in Rio de
Janeiro in 1912. U. S. Foreign Relations, 1912, p. 32.
16See Dr. Scott's discussion of "The International Language" in Carnegie Endowment Year-Book, 1923, pp. 285-289.
"69The American Delegates at the Fifth International Conference of American
States reported that they "experienced much difficulty" at Santiago because of
inadequate translation and interpretation. Report, p. 29.
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that such preparation was lacking.
This was recognized at the
Second-Hague Conference in the recommendation that a "preparatory
committee should be charged by the Governments" to arrange for the
work of the proposed third Conference.17 ' Thevalue of the new permanent agencies of the League of Nations for conducting such preparation--the Secretariat and the various permanent committees
maintained-cannot be overestimated.17 2
A third problem with reference to international legislation relates
to the revision of international conventions and keeping them up to
date. Some of the law-making declarations of the political conferences of the past century were made for all time to come. An enunciation of a fixed law of nature was not, before the days of Einstein at
any rate, to be influenced by the passing of time." 3 According to the
declaration of 1871, a state could only with difficulty escape from a
declaration to which it had once subscribed. But recent treaties
usually fix a time limit for their duration, and in most of the international legislation of the twentieth century it seems essential that
the door be left open for periodical revision. "Municipal legislation
can at any time be annulled or altered by the sovereign law-maker;
but international legislation is not open to such treatment."' 74 The
provisions for possible denunciation in the Hague Conventions seem
essential but insufficient. The recent labor conventions provide that
at least once in ten years, the Governing Body of the International
Labour Office shall report to the Conference on the working of each
Convention and shall consider the desirability of placing on the
75
agenda of the Conference the question of its revision or modification.
Other recent conventions such as the Customs Formalities Convention, the Obscene Publications Convention and the Conventions
adopted by the Conference on Transit and Communications specifically provide for possible revision. But the process of keeping legislation up to date makes it essential that conferences be held regularly
170"Another reason why no results werereached on several of the subjects introduced [at the Second Hague Conference] was the absence of preparation on the
part of many of the delegations." Higgins, The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 523.
See, also, Scott, Hague Peace Conferences, p. 736.
1nOn efforts of the United States to have this committee constituted, see U. S.
Foreign Relations, 1914, pp.4-5, io-ii. On the importance of the Pan-American
Union to the International Conferences of American States, see Reinsch, "The
Fourth International Conference of American Republics," 4 Amer. Jour. Int.

Law, 777, 785.
in2The Opium Conference in

1924

would have beenimpossible but for the work

of the Advisory Committee on Traffic in Opium, beginning in i92i.
'"There can be no prescription old enough to supersede the law of nature,
and the grant of God Almighty." James Otis, Rights of the British Colonies
(1765),
p. 6.
171ppenheim, The Future of International Law, p. 32. Cf. Pillet, Les Conventions De La Haye (1918), p. 89.
lYSee also Article I4 of the Industrial Property Convention of x883.
Treaties and Conventions, pp. 1939, 1948.

2

U. S.
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or periodically, and until permanent machinery such as the Council
and Assembly of the League of Nations had been established it was
always questionable whether regularity of meeting could be counted
upon. The various international public unions 78 and the International
Conferences of American States helped to vindicate the practise of
periodicity, and the establishment of the League of Nations has
resulted in very frequent conferences. With the Assembly and the
Labor Conference meeting each year, and with the Council meeting
four times each year, it is possible both to expedite preparatory
measures and to follow more closely the current working of international legislation.
Permanent machinery means also that agencies are at hand to
encourage the ratification or other acceptance of an international
convention after it has been promulgated by a conference. The adjournment of international conferences in the past has too frequently
meant that interest in its achievements sagged; the particular government which called the conference grew discouraged; and its results
were allowed to be forgotten. The Brussels Declaration of 1874 and
the Declaration of London of 19o9 were never ratified. The greatest
difficulty was experienced in putting into effect the Opium Convention
of 1912. Several of the treaties of the Washington Conference have
not yet been ratified, though three years have elapsed since it adjourned. Judge Moore has pointed out that the International Conferences of American States have had "one capital defect. They
lacked a permanent organization to carry on their work."7 Hence,
after they adjourned, the excellent and far-reaching plans which they
had incorporated in treaties, conventions, and resolutions often
lapsed and remained unexecuted for want of a continuous and permanent body to follow them up and attend to their ratification, application and development."' 178 The permanent organization has now
176The Universal Postal Union Convention of 1920 provides for a Congress at the
demand of two-thirds of the governments, and in any case not later than five years
after the entry into force of the acts concluded at the last Congress. See Article
27. See also Article 17 of the Pan-American Postal Union Convention of 192r.
Each General Assembly of the International Institute of Agriculture fixes the
date of the next session. The Conference on Weights and Measures meets once
in every six years, according to Article 7 of the Regulations annexed to the Convention of 1875, and Article 7 of the Regulations annexed to the Convention of
1921.

Cf. Article 21 of the Treaty for the Limitation of Naval Armament, signed at
Washington on February 6, 1922.
raThe Pan-American Union is maintained under a resolutionof the Conferences,
the Fifth Conference having postponed the preparation of a convention on the
subject.
See Report of American Delegates to the Fifth Conference, pp. 6, 125.
" 8 Moore, "The Work of the International High Commission", Senate Document
No. 261, 66th Congress, 2d Session, p. 4 (1920). On the action of Governments
with reference to treaties and conventions drawn up by the Conferences of American States, see the Handbook prepared by the Pan-American Union for theuseof
the Delegates to the Fifth Conference, pp. 6-2o.
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been supplied, and if some of the Conventions fathered by the League
of Nations have not been brought into force promptly, our situation
is a more hopeful one because it exists and functions.
All of these problems promise to give less difficulty in the post-war
world than they gave prior to I914, because fifty-five peoples are today maintaining the League of Nations. Cooperative efforts to
legislate for world society can now be undertaken with far greater
prospect of success than at any time in the past. Even the optimism
of Professor Oppenheim did not enable him to envisage the progress
which has been made in the five years since his death. With so much
fresh impetus given to the conception that international law may be
consciously made, we may sanguinely look forward to a generation of
productive effort, and possibly the results will mean a complete rejuvenation of the law of nations. Much of the new legislation will not
be the work of lawyers, but it must be incorporated into our legal
system and our profession cannot stand aloof while it is being made.
What then may we say of the prospect for international law in the
twentieth century? I doubt if there has been any other decade since
1625 when the prospect was so bright. The nineteenth century made
the peoples of the world into an international community. The
twentieth century must convert that community into an organized
society. The law of nations which will serve such a society must be in
large degree a law of the twentieth century's own making. It was not
handed down to us by Grotius, it was not distilled for us by the eighteenth century naturalists, it has not sprung out of the social and
industrial conditions of the nineteenth century. It must be the
creature of our twentieth century thinking, it must grow out of our
own efforts, blind though they may be, to meet twentieth century
needs. The building of such a law of nations offers us a romantic
opportunity for achievement. Our faith in ourselves and the patterns
in our minds will condition our success in taking advantage of it. We
cannot rest content with what has come down to us; we cannot simply
lengthen and broaden; we, too, must do some building. The foundations of our law, its aims and its philosophic roots, must be re-examined. At the same time we must meet the legal demands of a worka-day world which is as much in the throes of transition as was the
world of 1625. If we cannot match Grotius' achievement, we may at
least copy his method and share his daring, and I think we may hope
to make the twentieth century as significant as he made the seventeenth.

